Canada New Electronic Travel Authorization (eTA) Program Announced

On August 1, 2015, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) will introduce an Electronic Travel Authorization (eTA) Program. The eTA program objective is to establish a uniform process to screen visa-exempt foreign nationals prior to travel to Canada, in order to identify security threats prior to arrival in North America. The eTA program is modeled after the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), which applies to foreign nationals who enter the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program.  The program will not be mandatory until March 15, 2016.

CIC will begin accepting online eTA applications on August 1, 2015 for visa-exempt nationals who fly to Canada. Entry requirements will not change for entries made by land and sea. The following foreign nationals will need an eTA prior to entering Canada:

• Visa-exempt foreign nationals
• Foreign nationals who are U.S. Lawful Permanent Residents.
• Foreign nationals who are currently in Canada under a work or study permit must apply for an eTA.
• Foreign nationals applying for a work or study permit after August 1, 2015 will automatically be granted an eTA.

Importantly, U.S. citizens are exempt from the eTA requirement and do not need a visa to enter Canada.

Before traveling to Canada, foreign nationals must apply for an eTA through an online application process. An eTA will be issued within minutes and will be valid for five years or for the validity of the underlying passport, whichever comes first.

We encourage foreign nationals who will need an eTA to apply during the transition period from August 1, 2015 through March 15, 2016 to avoid any delays in travel to Canada. Gibney will continue to monitor this matter and provide updates as they become available. If you have any questions regarding this alert, please contact your designated Gibney representative, or email info@gibney.com.

This article is provided as general information for clients and friends of Gibney, Anthony & Flaherty, LLP. It does not constitute, and should not be construed as, legal advice. The contents of this article may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

New AAO Decision Impacts Changes in Worksite Location for H-1B Workers

On April 9, 2015, the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued a decision directly impacting many employers who currently employ H-1B nonimmigrant workers. The decision provides that a change to an H-1B worker’s authorized place of employment to a geographical area not covered by the original labor condition application (LCA) is a material change requiring the employer to file an amended or new H-1B petition, including a corresponding LCA certified by the Department of Labor (DOL). This decision clarifies and supersedes prior USCIS guidance on this issue, which left ambiguous the materiality of a worksite change to a different geographic area. Under the new decision, an employer anticipating imminent changes in a worksite location to a different geographic area for an H-1B worker must notify USCIS prior to the change through the filing of an H-1B petition.

Please note, changes of worksite within the same geographic Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) will likely continue to be governed by DOL guidance that an LCA is valid within an entire MSA, so long as prior notice is provided at the new worksite within the same MSA. In other words, a change of worksite within the same geographic MSA may not require a new H-1B petition, so long as notice is given to workers at the new worksite.

It is uncertain how soon USCIS may begin to adhere to the newly-issued decision in its daily operations. Gibney will continue to monitor this new development, and will work with our clients to understand the implications of this new decision and to develop effective strategies to comply with the policy set forth.

If you have any questions about this alert, please contact your Gibney representative or email info@gibney.com.

USCIS Releases New Guidance Concerning L-1B Workers

On March 24, 2015, USCIS released a long-anticipated Policy Memorandum on the L-1B visa category, which allows for an intra-company transfer of current foreign employees with “Specialized Knowledge” of the company.  USCIS has faced criticism for its high denial rates of L-1B visa petitions, with a recent National Foundation for American Policy report finding denial rates of 35% in 2014, up from 6% in 2006.  The Obama Administration has promised to reform the L-1B category, and this new USCIS Policy Memorandum appears to be the first step in fulfilling that promise.  USCIS will take comments on the Memo until May 8, 2015, with the final version going into effect on August 31, 2015.

The Memorandum proposes to rescind all prior USCIS internal guidance on the L-1B category, replacing it with clearer guidelines on specific aspects of L-1B adjudication, including:

  • Clarifying that the evidentiary standard for Specialized Knowledge is a “preponderance of the evidence,” a relatively lower standard
  • Providing that, according to the regulatory definition, a sponsored worker may qualify by possessing “special knowledge” of a company’s products or services OR “advanced knowledge” of a company’s processes and procedures
  • Noting that Specialized Knowledge is not limited to knowledge that is proprietary or absolutely unique to the transferring company, nor does such knowledge need to be narrowly held within the transferring company
  • Moreover, the petitioner is not required to demonstrate an absence of U.S. workers available to perform the duties of the L-1B worker
  • The Memo also provides a list of possible evidence that petitioners may submit to demonstrate Specialized Knowledge

Gibney will work with its clients to understand the implications of this new Policy Memo before the effective date of August 31, 2015, and to develop effective strategies to comply with the guidelines set forth.

If you have any questions about this alert, please contact your Gibney representative or email info@gibney.com.

Copyright Holder Sues Former Business Partner for Serving Her Recipes

Copyright protection may extend to a recipe book or cookbook because it is a compilation, but that protection is limited to way the content is presented and how the compilation’s elements are presented. The elements themselves are not necessarily protected by copyright law.

In Tomaydo-Tomahhdo LLC et al. v. Vozary et al., the plaintiff sued the defendant, a former business partner, for copying her recipes and offering the dishes at a competing restaurant. The plaintiff claimed she created the “Tomaydo Tomahhdo Recipe Book” in 2012 and obtained a copyright for her recipe book in 2014. After she learned that the defendant was offering the dishes from her recipe book at his restaurant, she brought a claim for copyright infringement against him and others claiming that the menus, offerings, recipes and presentation of food at his restaurant are nearly identical to her copyrighted “work”. In support of her claim, the plaintiff conducted a “comparison test” of the various recipes and menu items offered. According to the plaintiff, the results of the test were that the defendant copied her recipes.

The defendant argued that copyright protection does not extend to the recipes themselves, but may only be extended to the layout of the recipe and any other artistic elements in the book itself. Further, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s comparison test was inadmissible.

The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the copyright claim. The Court did not have to address the comparison test, because it found that the recipe itself is not protected. However, the Court did state that if it did use the comparison test, then the test shows the food items served by the defendant were different than those offered by the plaintiff. For example, the plaintiff’s chicken salad sandwich used provolone cheese and Defendant’s chicken salad sandwich used mozzarella cheese. The Court stated, “Certainly, plaintiffs cannot be suggesting that somehow copyright protection prevents defendants from serving chicken salad sandwiches.” The Court also dismissed the plaintiff’s supplemental state court claims, thereby dismissing the entire action.

The plaintiffs have filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit.

Employment Eligibility for Certain H-4 Visa Holders Effective May 26, 2015

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) published its final rule, effective May 26, 2015, confirming that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will extend employment authorization eligibility to certain H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants who are seeking employment-based lawful permanent resident (LPR) status.

In order to be eligible, the H-4 visa holder must be the dependent spouse of an H-1B nonimmigrant visa holder who:

  • Is the principal beneficiary of an approved Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker or
  • Has been granted H-1B status under sections 106(a) and (b) of the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 as amended by the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, known as AC21; AC21 permits H-1B nonimmigrants seeking lawful permanent residence to work and remain in the United States beyond the six-year limit on their H-1B status

Under the new rule, eligible H-4 dependent spouses will be able to file Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization, with supporting evidence and the required $380 fee in order to obtain employment authorization and receive an Employment Authorization Document (EAD).

USCIS will begin accepting applications on May 26, 2015. The H-4 dependent spouse will not be able to begin working in the United States until USCIS has approved the Form I-765 and the H-4 dependent spouse has received the EAD.

Gibney will work with clients and provide any updates as the rule is implemented.

If you have any questions about this alert, please contact your Gibney representative or email info@gibney.com.

Missed Opportunity to Register “Sriracha” Mark

As first reported in the LA Times, Huy Fong Foods, Inc., the originator of the famous spicy Sriracha sauce, may have missed its opportunity to trademark the term “Sriracha”. David Tran, the owner of Huy Fong Foods, named his sauce after a coastal city in Thailand and believed that it would be difficult to register the Sriracha mark for that reason.

Sriracha-style sauces include a combination of chili paste, vinegar, garlic and sugar. There are several brands marketing sauces using this recipe and the name Sriracha, including Frank’s Red Hot, Kikkoman, Lee Kum Kee, Taco Bell and Pizza Hut. Tran initially considered other companies’ use of the word “Sriracha” as free marketing for his product and his sales have grown from $60 million to $80 million in the past two years, according to the LA Times. However, when McIlhenny Co., the maker of Tabasco, announced its plan to release a hot sauce using the name Sriracha, Tran admitted that Tabasco’s use of the Sriracha mark may present a problem for his company.

Fortunately, Huy Fong Foods registered its signature rooster logo and green-capped bottle that holds their famous Sriracha sauce and licenses the right to use these trademarks to specialty producers, which helps to market their sauce. It does not appear that Huy Fong Foods has any intention of registering the mark at this time. In the event that Huy Fong Foods were to attempt to register the Sriracha trademark now, the USPTO may find that the term has become too generic.

The Foreign Counterfeit Merchandise Prevention Act

On January 9, 2015, Ted Poe (R-Texas) introduced the Foreign Counterfeit Merchandise Prevention Act (H.R. 236). The purpose of this bill is to amend the Trade Secrets Act to allow U.S. Customs and Border Protection to involve trademark and copyright owners in its investigation once it has seized a potential counterfeit shipment. A similar bill was previously introduced in 2012, but it was not passed.

Presently, U.S. Customs redacts bar codes and identifying marks before sharing photographs of the counterfeit merchandise with trademark owners pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1905, which provides for a broad criminal prohibition of disclosure of information by officers and federal employees. The new bill creates an exception to 18 U.S.C. §1905 by explicitly allowing U.S. Customs to provide a trademark or copyright owner with information, samples and images of the counterfeit merchandise and retail packaging. The bill includes also includes an amendment to §42 of the Lanham Act, which allows U.S. Customs to provide information, digital images and samples (subject to a bond) to the trademark owner.

The bill was assigned to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations of the House Judiciary Committee.

This article is provided as general information for clients and friends of Gibney, Anthony & Flaherty, LLP. It does not constitute, and should not be construed as, legal advice. The contents of this article may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Supreme Court Holds Trademark Tacking to Be Decided by Juries

The Supreme Court ruled that trademark tacking is a question of fact for the jury to decide in Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank. Tacking allows a trademark owner to alter its mark while maintaining the older first-use date for the original mark. The new mark is “tacked” onto the older priority date.

In Hana Financial, the Plaintiff sued Hana Bank and others for trademark infringement and related claims. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the infringement claim, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to the trial due to the factual issues relating to the priority issue. On remand, the jury found in favor of Defendants. The plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of law, which was denied by the trial court. The plaintiff appealed this case to the Ninth Circuit claiming that the determination of whether a trademark may be “tacked” to a prior mark is a question of law that must be determined by the court, not a question of fact that may be decided by the jury. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also affirmed.

Coca-Cola Seeks to Trademark Hashtags

On December 15, 2014, Coca-Cola Co. filed trademark applications for the following hashtags: #cokecanpics and #smilewithacoke with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. These hashtags are currently being used on Twitter in connection with the company’s soft drinks. This is the first time that Coca-Cola has applied to trademark a hashtag.

Hashtags consist of a number sign followed by a word or phrase. Hashtags are a useful way to categorize conversations within and across multiple platforms, including Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. A user can click on the hashtag and see content posted by other users with the same hashtag. Other companies have already registered hashtags as trademarks. However, the law on the ownership of hashtags is still developing.

Argentina’s Supreme Court Rules on Third Party Liability

On October 28, 2014, the Supreme Court of Argentina ruled that search engines are not liable for unlawful third-party content appearing in search results. This groundbreaking ruling will have a significant impact on the question of intermediary liability in Latin America.

Maria Belen Rodriguez, a singer and model, sued Google, Inc. and Yahoo alleging that the search engines linked her name and image to sites containing porn and sexually explicit material. Ms. Rodriguez asked the trial court to order the Defendants (1) to remove all search results associating her name to websites of a sexual, pornographic, erotic or similar nature; (2) to remove all thumbnails depicting her image from the search results; and (3) to pay damages in the amount of AR$ 300,000 plus interests, as a result of the association of her name and personal image to sites of an offensive nature. The lower courts ruled that the search engines were not liable for third-party violations until a court ordered them to remove the illegal content.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that search engines may be found liable for third party content if they have actual knowledge of its infringing nature and fail to take corrective steps thereafter. The Supreme Court further stated the type of notice that must be served on the search engines should establish actual knowledge. The Court of Appeals previously ruled that the Defendants weren’t negligent in reacting to the takedown order and thus, the Supreme Court found the search engines were not liable to Ms. Rodriguez.